On the measurement of privacy as an attacker's estimation error
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Cita com:
hdl:2117/18044
Tipus de documentArticle
Data publicació2012
Condicions d'accésAccés obert
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Reconeixement-NoComercial-SenseObraDerivada 3.0 Espanya
Abstract
A wide variety of privacy metrics have been proposed in the literature to evaluate the level of protection offered by privacy enhancing-technologies. Most of these metrics are specific to concrete systems and adversarial models, and are difficult to generalize or translate to other contexts. Furthermore, a better understanding of the relationships between the different privacy metrics is needed to enable more grounded and
systematic approach to measuring privacy, as well as to assist system designers in selecting the most appropriate metric for a
given application.
In this work we propose a theoretical framework for privacypreserving
systems, endowed with a general definition of privacy in terms of the estimation error incurred by an attacker who aims
to disclose the private information that the system is designed to conceal. We show that our framework permits interpreting and
comparing a number of well-known metrics under a common perspective.
The arguments behind these interpretations are based on fundamental results related to the theories of information, probability and Bayes decision.
CitacióRebollo-Monedero, D. [et al.]. On the measurement of privacy as an attacker's estimation error. "International journal of information security", 2012.
ISSN1615-5262
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