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http://hdl.handle.net/2117/3429
Thu, 23 Oct 2014 04:47:01 GMT2014-10-23T04:47:01Zwebmaster.bupc@upc.eduUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Servei de Biblioteques i DocumentaciónoPower indices of influence games and new centrality measures for agent societies and social networks
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/24245
Title: Power indices of influence games and new centrality measures for agent societies and social networks
Authors: Molinero Albareda, Xavier; Riquelme Csori, Fabián; Serna Iglesias, María José
Abstract: We propose as centrality measures for social networks two classical power indices, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik, and two new measures, effort and satisfaction, related to the spread of influence process that emerge from the subjacent influence game. We perform a comparison of these measures with three well known centrality measures, degree, closeness and betweenness, applied to three simple social networks.Fri, 03 Oct 2014 13:58:17 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/242452014-10-03T13:58:17ZMolinero Albareda, Xavier; Riquelme Csori, Fabián; Serna Iglesias, María JosénoSocial network, Centrality, Power index, Influence game, Simple gameWe propose as centrality measures for social networks two classical power indices, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik, and two new measures, effort and satisfaction, related to the spread of influence process that emerge from the subjacent influence game. We perform a comparison of these measures with three well known centrality measures, degree, closeness and betweenness, applied to three simple social networks.On a-roughly weighted games
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/24210
Title: On a-roughly weighted games
Authors: Freixas Bosch, Josep; Kurz, Sascha
Abstract: Gvozdeva, Hemaspaandra, and Slinko (2011) have introduced three hierarchies for simple games in order to measure the distance of a given simple game to the class of (roughly) weighted voting games. Their third class C-alpha consists of all simple games permitting a weighted representation such that each winning coalition has a weight of at least and each losing coalition a weight of at most alpha. For a given game the minimal possible value of alpha is called its critical threshold value. We continue the work on the critical threshold value, initiated by Gvozdeva et al., and contribute some new results on the possible values for a given number of voters as well as some general bounds for restricted subclasses of games. A strong relation between this concept and the cost of stability, i.e. the minimum amount of external payment to ensure stability in a coalitional game, is uncovered.Thu, 02 Oct 2014 16:20:55 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/242102014-10-02T16:20:55ZFreixas Bosch, Josep; Kurz, SaschanoSimple game, Weighted game, Complete simple game, Roughly weighted game, Voting theory, HierarchyGvozdeva, Hemaspaandra, and Slinko (2011) have introduced three hierarchies for simple games in order to measure the distance of a given simple game to the class of (roughly) weighted voting games. Their third class C-alpha consists of all simple games permitting a weighted representation such that each winning coalition has a weight of at least and each losing coalition a weight of at most alpha. For a given game the minimal possible value of alpha is called its critical threshold value. We continue the work on the critical threshold value, initiated by Gvozdeva et al., and contribute some new results on the possible values for a given number of voters as well as some general bounds for restricted subclasses of games. A strong relation between this concept and the cost of stability, i.e. the minimum amount of external payment to ensure stability in a coalitional game, is uncovered.The representativeness reliability importance measure
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/24048
Title: The representativeness reliability importance measure
Authors: Freixas Bosch, Josep; Pons Vallès, Montserrat
Abstract: A new reliability importance measure for
components in a system, that we call Representativeness
measure, is introduced. It evaluates to which extent the
performance of a component is representative of the
performance of the whole system. Its relationship with
Birnbaum’s measure is analyzed, and the ranking of
components given by both measures are compared. These
rankings happen to be equal when all components have the
same reliability but different in general. In contrast with
Birnbaum’s, the Representativeness reliability importance
measure of a component does depend on its reliability.Fri, 12 Sep 2014 10:45:20 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/240482014-09-12T10:45:20ZFreixas Bosch, Josep; Pons Vallès, MontserratnoReliability importance measures, Structural importance measures, Criticality relation, Coherent systems, node criticality relation, Birnbaum RIM, Birnbaum SIMA new reliability importance measure for
components in a system, that we call Representativeness
measure, is introduced. It evaluates to which extent the
performance of a component is representative of the
performance of the whole system. Its relationship with
Birnbaum’s measure is analyzed, and the ranking of
components given by both measures are compared. These
rankings happen to be equal when all components have the
same reliability but different in general. In contrast with
Birnbaum’s, the Representativeness reliability importance
measure of a component does depend on its reliability.Help to new students of ICT Systems Engineering Degree at EPSEM-UPC: Mentoring
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/23423
Title: Help to new students of ICT Systems Engineering Degree at EPSEM-UPC: Mentoring
Authors: Gorchs Altarriba, Roser; Molinero Albareda, Xavier
Abstract: New students at the Manresa School of Engineering (EPSEM, Escola Politècnica Superior d'Enginyeria de Manresa) of the Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC) are voluntarily provided with the mentoring service during their initial period at University. Mentoring gives academic, teaching and self-organizational support. It improves academic results and reduces the desertion of the studies. In particular, the mentor is an experimented learner which studies in the last year of his/her Degree.
The goal is to expose such mentoring applied to ICT (Information, Communication and Technology) Systems Engineering Degree at EPSEM, studies of new creation which are probably unique in Spain, and to present a treatment and analysis of the performance and possible actions of continuous improvement.
However, it is necessary to take into account that the mentoring has been implemented just three years because of grants finished, so it should be necessary to start again with mentoring to develop a more exhaustive paper.Tue, 08 Jul 2014 08:33:18 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/234232014-07-08T08:33:18ZGorchs Altarriba, Roser; Molinero Albareda, XaviernoMentoring, Coaching, ICT, Engineering Education.New students at the Manresa School of Engineering (EPSEM, Escola Politècnica Superior d'Enginyeria de Manresa) of the Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC) are voluntarily provided with the mentoring service during their initial period at University. Mentoring gives academic, teaching and self-organizational support. It improves academic results and reduces the desertion of the studies. In particular, the mentor is an experimented learner which studies in the last year of his/her Degree.
The goal is to expose such mentoring applied to ICT (Information, Communication and Technology) Systems Engineering Degree at EPSEM, studies of new creation which are probably unique in Spain, and to present a treatment and analysis of the performance and possible actions of continuous improvement.
However, it is necessary to take into account that the mentoring has been implemented just three years because of grants finished, so it should be necessary to start again with mentoring to develop a more exhaustive paper.Partnership formation and multinomial values
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/23396
Title: Partnership formation and multinomial values
Authors: Giménez Pradales, José Miguel; Llongueras Arola, Maria Dolors; Puente del Campo, María Albina
Abstract: We use multinomial values to study the effects of the partnership formation in cooperative games, comparing the joint effect on the involved players with the alternative alliance formation. The simple game case is especially considered and the application to the Catalonia Parliament (Legislature 2003-2007) is also studied.Thu, 03 Jul 2014 11:35:20 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/233962014-07-03T11:35:20ZGiménez Pradales, José Miguel; Llongueras Arola, Maria Dolors; Puente del Campo, María AlbinanoCooperative game, Coalition formation, Partnership, Multinomial values, Simple games, Binomial semivaluesWe use multinomial values to study the effects of the partnership formation in cooperative games, comparing the joint effect on the involved players with the alternative alliance formation. The simple game case is especially considered and the application to the Catalonia Parliament (Legislature 2003-2007) is also studied.Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/23250
Title: Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule
Authors: Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Owen Salazar, Guillermo
Abstract: The developments over a thirty-year time span in the study of power, especially voting power, are traced in this book, which provides an up-to-date overview of applications of n-person game theory to the study of power in multimember bodies. Other theories that shed light on power distribution (e.g. aggregation theory) are treated as well. the book revisits the themes discussed in the well-known 1982 publicationTue, 17 Jun 2014 13:52:14 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/232502014-06-17T13:52:14ZCarreras Escobar, Francisco; Owen Salazar, GuillermonoThe developments over a thirty-year time span in the study of power, especially voting power, are traced in this book, which provides an up-to-date overview of applications of n-person game theory to the study of power in multimember bodies. Other theories that shed light on power distribution (e.g. aggregation theory) are treated as well. the book revisits the themes discussed in the well-known 1982 publicationPower, cooperation indices and coalition structures
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/23234
Title: Power, cooperation indices and coalition structures
Authors: Amer Ramon, Rafael; Carreras Escobar, Francisco
Abstract: The developments over a thirty-year time span in the study of power, especially voting power, are traced in this book, which provides an up-to-date overview of applications of n-person game theory to the study of power in multimember bodies. Other theories that shed light on power distribution (e.g. aggregation theory) are treated as well. the book revisits the themes discussed in the well-known 1982 publicationMon, 16 Jun 2014 15:20:46 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/232342014-06-16T15:20:46ZAmer Ramon, Rafael; Carreras Escobar, FrancisconoThe developments over a thirty-year time span in the study of power, especially voting power, are traced in this book, which provides an up-to-date overview of applications of n-person game theory to the study of power in multimember bodies. Other theories that shed light on power distribution (e.g. aggregation theory) are treated as well. the book revisits the themes discussed in the well-known 1982 publicationSymmetric coalitional binomial semivalues
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/23187
Title: Symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues
Authors: Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Puente del Campo, María Albina
Abstract: We introduce here a family of mixed coalitional values. They extend the binomial semivalues to games endowed with a coalition structure, satisfy the property of symmetry in the quotient game and the quotient game property, generalize the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value introduced by Alonso and Fiestras and link and merge the Shapley value and the binomial semivalues. A computational procedure in terms of the multilinear extension of the original game is also provided and an application to political science is sketchedSun, 08 Jun 2014 14:34:07 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/231872014-06-08T14:34:07ZCarreras Escobar, Francisco; Puente del Campo, María AlbinanoBinomial semivalue, Coalition structure, Multilinear extensionWe introduce here a family of mixed coalitional values. They extend the binomial semivalues to games endowed with a coalition structure, satisfy the property of symmetry in the quotient game and the quotient game property, generalize the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value introduced by Alonso and Fiestras and link and merge the Shapley value and the binomial semivalues. A computational procedure in terms of the multilinear extension of the original game is also provided and an application to political science is sketchedOn the uniqueness and analyticity of solutions in micropolar thermoviscoelasticity
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/21495
Title: On the uniqueness and analyticity of solutions in micropolar thermoviscoelasticity
Authors: Magaña Nieto, Antonio; Quintanilla de Latorre, Ramón
Abstract: This paper deals with the linear theory of isotropic micropolar thermoviscoelastic materials. When the dissipation is positive definite, we present two uniqueness theorems. The first one requires the extra assumption that some coupling terms vanish; in this case, the instability of solutions is also proved. When the internal energy and the dissipation are both positive definite, we prove the well-posedness of the problem and the analyticity of the solutions. Exponential decay and impossibility of localization are corollaries of the analyticity.Mon, 10 Feb 2014 14:06:59 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/214952014-02-10T14:06:59ZMagaña Nieto, Antonio; Quintanilla de Latorre, RamónnoMicropolar thermoviscoelasticity, Uniqueness, Analyticity, Exponential decayThis paper deals with the linear theory of isotropic micropolar thermoviscoelastic materials. When the dissipation is positive definite, we present two uniqueness theorems. The first one requires the extra assumption that some coupling terms vanish; in this case, the instability of solutions is also proved. When the internal energy and the dissipation are both positive definite, we prove the well-posedness of the problem and the analyticity of the solutions. Exponential decay and impossibility of localization are corollaries of the analyticity.The minimum sum representation as an index of voting power
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/21411
Title: The minimum sum representation as an index of voting power
Authors: Freixas Bosch, Josep; Kaniovski, Serguei
Abstract: We propose a new power index based on the minimum sum representation (MSR) of a
weighted voting game. The MSR o ers a redesign of a voting game, such that voting power
as measured by the MSR index becomes proportional to voting weight. The MSR index is a
coherent measure of power that is ordinally equivalent to the Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik and
Johnston indices. We provide a characterization for a bicameral meet as a weighted game or
a complete game, and show that the MSR index is immune to the bicameral meet paradox.
We discuss the computation of the MSR index using a linear integer program and the inverse MSR problem of designing a weighted voting game with a given distribution of power.Thu, 30 Jan 2014 19:11:23 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/214112014-01-30T19:11:23ZFreixas Bosch, Josep; Kaniovski, SergueinoBicameral meet, Minimum integer sum representation, Power indices, Proportional design between shares and power, RankingsWe propose a new power index based on the minimum sum representation (MSR) of a
weighted voting game. The MSR o ers a redesign of a voting game, such that voting power
as measured by the MSR index becomes proportional to voting weight. The MSR index is a
coherent measure of power that is ordinally equivalent to the Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik and
Johnston indices. We provide a characterization for a bicameral meet as a weighted game or
a complete game, and show that the MSR index is immune to the bicameral meet paradox.
We discuss the computation of the MSR index using a linear integer program and the inverse MSR problem of designing a weighted voting game with a given distribution of power.Reconstructing a simple game from a uniparametric family of allocations
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/20914
Title: Reconstructing a simple game from a uniparametric family of allocations
Authors: Amer Ramon, Rafael; Giménez Pradales, José Miguel; Magaña Nieto, Antonio
Abstract: Several relationships between simple games and a particular type of solu-
tions for cooperative games are studied in this paper. These solutions belong to the
set of semivalues and they are related to a unique parameter that explicitly provides
their weighting coefficients. Through the allocations offered by this family of solu-
tions, so-called binomial semivalues, and also from their respective potentials, some
characteristics of the simple games can be recovered. The paper analyzes the capacity
of binomial semivalues to summarize the structure of simple games, and, moreover,
a property of separation among simple games is given.Wed, 04 Dec 2013 16:00:12 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/209142013-12-04T16:00:12ZAmer Ramon, Rafael; Giménez Pradales, José Miguel; Magaña Nieto, AntonionoBanzhaf value, Game theory, Potential, Semivalue, Simple gameSeveral relationships between simple games and a particular type of solu-
tions for cooperative games are studied in this paper. These solutions belong to the
set of semivalues and they are related to a unique parameter that explicitly provides
their weighting coefficients. Through the allocations offered by this family of solu-
tions, so-called binomial semivalues, and also from their respective potentials, some
characteristics of the simple games can be recovered. The paper analyzes the capacity
of binomial semivalues to summarize the structure of simple games, and, moreover,
a property of separation among simple games is given.Cooperation tendencies and evaluation of games
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/20534
Title: Cooperation tendencies and evaluation of games
Authors: Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Puente del Campo, María Albina
Abstract: Multinomial probabilistic values were first introduced by one of us in reliability and later on by the other,
independently, as power indices. Here we study them on cooperative games from several viewpoints, and especially
as a powerful generalization of binomial semivalues. We establish a dimensional comparison between
multinomial values and binomial semivalues and provide two characterizations within the class of probabilistic
values: one for each multinomial value and another for the whole family. An example illustrates their use
in practice as power indices.Tue, 05 Nov 2013 19:13:56 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/205342013-11-05T19:13:56ZCarreras Escobar, Francisco; Puente del Campo, María AlbinanoShapley value, Probabilistic value, Binomial semivalueMultinomial probabilistic values were first introduced by one of us in reliability and later on by the other,
independently, as power indices. Here we study them on cooperative games from several viewpoints, and especially
as a powerful generalization of binomial semivalues. We establish a dimensional comparison between
multinomial values and binomial semivalues and provide two characterizations within the class of probabilistic
values: one for each multinomial value and another for the whole family. An example illustrates their use
in practice as power indices.Computation of several power indices by generating functions
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/17925
Title: Computation of several power indices by generating functions
Authors: Alonso Meijide, José María; Freixas Bosch, Josep; Molinero Albareda, Xavier
Abstract: In this paper we propose methods to compute the Deegan-Packel, the Public
Good, and the Shift power indices by generating functions for the particular
case of weighted voting games. Furthermore, we define a new power index
which combines the ideas of the Shift and the Deegan-Packel power indices and
also propose a method to compute it with generating functions. We conclude
by some comments about the complexity to compute these power indices.Fri, 22 Feb 2013 10:25:06 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/179252013-02-22T10:25:06ZAlonso Meijide, José María; Freixas Bosch, Josep; Molinero Albareda, XaviernoIn this paper we propose methods to compute the Deegan-Packel, the Public
Good, and the Shift power indices by generating functions for the particular
case of weighted voting games. Furthermore, we define a new power index
which combines the ideas of the Shift and the Deegan-Packel power indices and
also propose a method to compute it with generating functions. We conclude
by some comments about the complexity to compute these power indices.Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/16208
Title: Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule
Authors: Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Owen Salazar, Guillermo
Abstract: Pure bargaining problems with transferable utility are considered. By associating a quasi-additive cooperative game with each one of them, a Shapley rule for this class of problems is derived from the Shapley value for games. The analysis of this new rule includes axiomatic characterizations and a comparison with the proportional rule.Mon, 09 Jul 2012 11:56:32 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/162082012-07-09T11:56:32ZCarreras Escobar, Francisco; Owen Salazar, GuillermonoPure bargaining problems with transferable utility are considered. By associating a quasi-additive cooperative game with each one of them, a Shapley rule for this class of problems is derived from the Shapley value for games. The analysis of this new rule includes axiomatic characterizations and a comparison with the proportional rule.Accessibility measures to nodes of directed graphs using solutions for generalized cooperative games
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/16206
Title: Accessibility measures to nodes of directed graphs using solutions for generalized cooperative games
Authors: Amer Ramon, Rafael; Giménez Pradales, José Miguel; Magaña Nieto, Antonio
Abstract: The aim of this paper consists of constructing accessibility measures to
the nodes of directed graphs using methods of Game Theory. Since digraphs without a
predefined game are considered, the main part of the paper is devoted to establish conditions
on cooperative games so that they can be used to measure accessibility. Games
that satisfy desirable properties are called test games. Each ranking on the nodes is
then obtained according to a pair formed by a test game and a solution defined on
cooperative games whose utilities are given on ordered coalitions. The solutions proposed
here are extensions of the wide family of semivalues to games in generalized
characteristic function form.Mon, 09 Jul 2012 11:34:13 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/162062012-07-09T11:34:13ZAmer Ramon, Rafael; Giménez Pradales, José Miguel; Magaña Nieto, AntonionoGame theory, Digraph, Accessibility, Cooperative game, SemivalueThe aim of this paper consists of constructing accessibility measures to
the nodes of directed graphs using methods of Game Theory. Since digraphs without a
predefined game are considered, the main part of the paper is devoted to establish conditions
on cooperative games so that they can be used to measure accessibility. Games
that satisfy desirable properties are called test games. Each ranking on the nodes is
then obtained according to a pair formed by a test game and a solution defined on
cooperative games whose utilities are given on ordered coalitions. The solutions proposed
here are extensions of the wide family of semivalues to games in generalized
characteristic function form.