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    <title>DSpace Collection:</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2117/3432</link>
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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://hdl.handle.net/2117/10491" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://hdl.handle.net/2117/9479" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://hdl.handle.net/2117/9110" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://hdl.handle.net/2117/6862" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://hdl.handle.net/2117/6800" />
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    <dc:date>2013-05-22T12:15:03Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/2117/10491">
    <title>Nodes of directed graphs ranked by solutions defined on cooperative games</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2117/10491</link>
    <description>Title: Nodes of directed graphs ranked by solutions defined on cooperative games
Authors: Amer Ramon, Rafael; Giménez Pradales, José Miguel; Magaña Nieto, Antonio
Abstract: Hierarchical structures, transportation systems, communication networks and&#xD;
even sports competitions can be modeled by means of directed graphs. Since&#xD;
digraphs without a predefined game are considered, the main part of the work is&#xD;
devoted to establish conditions on cooperative games so that they can be used&#xD;
to measure accessibility to the nodes. Games that satisfy desirable properties&#xD;
are called test games. Each ranking on the nodes is then obtained according&#xD;
to a pair formed by a test game and a solution defined on cooperative games&#xD;
whose utilities are given for every ordered coalition. Solutions here proposed&#xD;
are extensions of the wide family of semivalues to games in generalized characteristic&#xD;
function form.</description>
    <dc:date>2010-12-02T15:26:30Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/2117/9479">
    <title>Consorcios y valor de Shapley</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2117/9479</link>
    <description>Title: Consorcios y valor de Shapley
Authors: Llongueras Arola, Maria Dolors; Magaña Nieto, Antonio
Abstract: La coordindación de estrategias en un juego cooperativo, cuando un grupo de jugadores decide actuar en conjunto es la base de la noción de consorcio. Un consorcio en un juego cooperativo es una coalición que posee una estructura interna y, al mismo tiempo, se comporta como un miembro individual. En este trabajo se define el valor de consorcio de Shapley y se determinan expresiones para la diferencia entre el valor de Shapley de un jugador en el juego inicial y su valor de Shapleu en el juego de consorcio.</description>
    <dc:date>2010-10-06T18:07:53Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/2117/9110">
    <title>On the generalized decisiveness of decisive symmetric games</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2117/9110</link>
    <description>Title: On the generalized decisiveness of decisive symmetric games
Authors: Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Freixas Bosch, Josep; Puente del Campo, María Albina
Abstract: We study several functions related to the decisiveness of simple games. The analysis, including the asymptotic behavior as the number of players increases, is restricted to decisive symmetric games and their compositions, and it is assumed that all players share a common assessment of the proposal they are facing.</description>
    <dc:date>2010-09-27T13:36:47Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/2117/6862">
    <title>Juegos cooperativos y conflictos de intereses. Teoría y práctica. MTM 2006-06064</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2117/6862</link>
    <description>Title: Juegos cooperativos y conflictos de intereses. Teoría y práctica. MTM 2006-06064
Authors: Carreras Escobar, Francisco</description>
    <dc:date>2010-04-06T16:10:30Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/2117/6800">
    <title>On pure bargaining problems</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2117/6800</link>
    <description>Title: On pure bargaining problems
Authors: Carreras Escobar, Francisco
Abstract: Pure bargaining problems are considered. By attaching a quasi–additive&#xD;
cooperative game to each one of them, a Shapley rule for this class of&#xD;
problems is derived from the Shapley value for cooperative games. The&#xD;
analysis of this new rule includes some axiomatic characterizations and a&#xD;
comparison with the classical proportional rule.</description>
    <dc:date>2010-03-24T15:22:19Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/2117/6318">
    <title>A note about decisive symmetric games</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2117/6318</link>
    <description>Title: A note about decisive symmetric games
Authors: Puente del Campo, María Albina; Freixas Bosch, Josep; Carreras Escobar, Francisco
Abstract: S'estudien diverses funcions relacionades amb la presa de decisions en jocs simples. L'anàlisi es restringeix a jocs de decisió simètrics i la seva composició i es dóna per suposat que tots els jugadors comparteixen els mateixos objectius pels quals ells competeixen.</description>
    <dc:date>2010-02-08T15:40:35Z</dc:date>
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