Ara es mostren els items 1-11 de 11

    • Bounds for the Nakamura number 

      Freixas Bosch, Josep; Kurz, Sascha (Springer, 2019-04)
      Article
      Accés obert
      The Nakamura number is an appropriate invariant of a simple game to study the existence of social equilibria and the possibility of cycles. For symmetric (quota) games its number can be obtained by an easy formula. For ...
    • Dimension and codimension of simple games 

      Kurz, Sascha; Molinero Albareda, Xavier; Olsen, Martin; Serna Iglesias, María José (2016-11-01)
      Article
      Accés obert
      This paper studies the complexity of computing a representation of a simple game as the intersection (union) of weighted majority games, as well as, the dimension or the codimension. We also present some examples with ...
    • Enumeration of simple games with two equivalence classes of players 

      Kurz, Sascha; Samaniego Vidal, Daniel (Elsevier, 2023-07-31)
      Article
      Accés obert
      Many real-world voting systems consist of voters that occur in just two different types. Indeed, each voting system with a “House” and a “Senate” is of that type. Here we present structural characterizations and an explicit ...
    • Enumeration of weighted games with minimum and an analysis of voting power for bipartite complete games with minimum 

      Freixas Bosch, Josep; Kurz, Sascha (2014-11)
      Article
      Accés obert
      This paper is a twofold contribution. First, it contributes to the problem of enumerating some classes of simple games and in particular provides the number of weighted games with minimum and the number of weighted games ...
    • On a-roughly weighted games 

      Freixas Bosch, Josep; Kurz, Sascha (2014-08)
      Article
      Accés obert
      Gvozdeva, Hemaspaandra, and Slinko (2011) have introduced three hierarchies for simple games in order to measure the distance of a given simple game to the class of (roughly) weighted voting games. Their third class C-alpha ...
    • On alpha-roughly weighted games 

      Freixas Bosch, Josep; Kurz, Sascha (2011-12-13)
      Report de recerca
      Accés obert
      Very recently Gvozdeva, Hemaspaandra, and Slinko (2011) h ave introduced three hierarchies for simple games in order to measure the distance of a given simple game to the class of weighted voting games or roughly weighted ...
    • On minimum integer representations of weighted games 

      Freixas Bosch, Josep; Kurz, Sascha (North Holland Mathematical Library, 2014-01-01)
      Article
      Accés obert
      We study minimum integer representations of weighted games, i.e. representations where the weights are integers and every other integer representation is at least as large in each component. Those minimum integer ...
    • On the characterization of weighted simple games 

      Freixas Bosch, Josep; Freixas Boleda, Marc; Kurz, Sascha (2017-12)
      Capítol de llibre
      Accés obert
      This paper has a twofold scope. The first one is to clarify and put in evidence the isomorphic character of two theories developed in quite different fields: on one side, threshold logic, on the other side, simple games. ...
    • On the construction of high dimensional simple games 

      Olsen, Martin; Kurz, Sascha; Molinero Albareda, Xavier (IOS Press, 2016)
      Text en actes de congrés
      Accés obert
      Voting is a commonly applied method for the aggregation of the preferences of multiple agents into a joint decision. If preferences are binary, i.e., “yes” and “no”, every voting system can be described by a (monotone) ...
    • The cost of getting local monotonicity 

      Freixas Bosch, Josep; Kurz, Sascha (Elsevier, 2016-06-01)
      Article
      Accés obert
      Committees with yes-no-decisions are commonly modeled as simple games and the ability of a member to influence the group decision is measured by so-called power indices. For a weighted game we say that a power index satisfies ...
    • The golden number and Fibonacci sequences in the design of voting structures 

      Freixas Bosch, Josep; Kurz, Sascha (Elsevier, 2013)
      Article
      Accés obert
      Some distinguished types of voters, as vetoes, passers or nulls, as well as some others, play a significant role in voting systems because they are either the most powerful or the least powerful voters in the game independently ...