Now showing items 1-7 of 7

  • A new coalitional value 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Alonso Meijide, José María (2009-10-17)
    External research report
    Restricted access - author's decision
    We propose a modification of the Shapley value for monotonic games with a coalition structure. The resulting coalitional value is a twofold extension of the Shapley value in the following sense: (1) the amount obtained by ...
  • A new power index based on minimal winning coalitions 

    Freixas Bosch, Josep; Alonso Meijide, José María (2009)
    External research report
    Restricted access - author's decision
    Nou índex de poder basat en coalicions shift-minimals
  • A new power index based on minimal winning coalitions without any surplus 

    Alonso Meijide, José María; Freixas Bosch, Josep (2010-04)
    Article
    Restricted access - author's decision
    In this paper we propose a new power index useful for the evaluation of each member in a committee, or democratic institution, and the degree of influence over the voting decision making system. The proposed solution is ...
  • A proportional extension of the Shapley value for monotone games with a coalition structure 

    Alonso Meijide, José María; Carreras Escobar, Francisco (2009-03-06)
    External research report
    Restricted access - author's decision
    The Owen value is a modification of the Shapley value for games with a coalition structure. In this paper, we propose another modification of the Shapley value for monotone games with a coalition structure. This new value ...
  • Computation of several power indices by generating functions 

    Alonso Meijide, José María; Freixas Bosch, Josep; Molinero Albareda, Xavier (2012)
    Article
    Open Access
    In this paper we propose methods to compute the Deegan-Packel, the Public Good, and the Shift power indices by generating functions for the particular case of weighted voting games. Furthermore, we define a new power ...
  • The proportional coalitional Shapley value 

    Alonso Meijide, José María; Carreras Escobar, Francisco (2011-06)
    Article
    Restricted access - publisher's policy
    We propose a modification of the Shapley value for monotonic games with a coalition structure. The resulting coalitional value is a twofold extension of the Shapley value in the following sense: (1) the amount obtained by ...
  • The proportional partitional Shapley value 

    Alonso Meijide, José María; Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Costa Bouzas, Julián; García Jurado, Ignacio (2015-05)
    Article
    Restricted access - publisher's policy
    A new coalitional value is proposed under the hypothesis of isolated unions. The main difference between this value and the Aumann–Drèze value is that the allocations within each union are not given by the Shapley value ...