Ara es mostren els items 1-20 de 30

  • A new coalitional value 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Alonso Meijide, José María (2009-10-17)
    Report de recerca
    Accés restringit per decisió de l'autor
    We propose a modification of the Shapley value for monotonic games with a coalition structure. The resulting coalitional value is a twofold extension of the Shapley value in the following sense: (1) the amount obtained by ...
  • A note about decisive symmetric games 

    Puente del Campo, María Albina; Freixas Bosch, Josep; Carreras Escobar, Francisco (2009-04)
    Comunicació de congrés
    Accés restringit per decisió de l'autor
    S'estudien diverses funcions relacionades amb la presa de decisions en jocs simples. L'anàlisi es restringeix a jocs de decisió simètrics i la seva composició i es dóna per suposat que tots els jugadors comparteixen els ...
  • A note on decisive symmetric games 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Freixas Bosch, Josep; Puente del Campo, María Albina (2011)
    Article
    Accés restringit per política de l'editorial
    Binary voting systems, usually represented by simple games, constitute a main DSS topic. A crucial feature of such a system is the easiness with which a proposal can be collectively accepted, which is measured by ...
  • A note on multinomial probabilistic values 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Puente del Campo, María Albina (Springer, 2017-12)
    Article
    Accés restringit per política de l'editorial
    Multinomial values were previously introduced by one of the authors in reliability and extended later to all cooperative games. Here, we present for this subfamily of probabilistic values three new results, previously ...
  • A proportional extension of the Shapley value for monotone games with a coalition structure 

    Alonso Meijide, José María; Carreras Escobar, Francisco (2009-03-06)
    Report de recerca
    Accés restringit per decisió de l'autor
    The Owen value is a modification of the Shapley value for games with a coalition structure. In this paper, we propose another modification of the Shapley value for monotone games with a coalition structure. This new value ...
  • Aplicaciones de los juegos cooperativos a la actividad empresarial 

    Amer Ramon, Rafael; Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Magaña Nieto, Antonio (2008-04)
    Article
    Accés obert
    Presentamos diversas aplicaciones de los juegos cooperativos y del valor de Shapley al contexto empresarial. Entre ellas destacamos el reparto de costes o beneficios. En el texto se describe el marco axiomático propuesto ...
  • Coalitional multinomial probabilistic values 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Puente del Campo, María Albina (Elsevier, 2015-08)
    Article
    Accés restringit per política de l'editorial
    We introduce a new family of coalitional values designed to take into account players’ attitudes with regard to cooperation. This new family of values applies to cooperative games with a coalition structure by combining ...
  • Cooperación y defensa 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco (Institut d'estadística de Catalunya, 1993)
    Article
    Accés obert
    Se aplican conceptos y técnicas de la teoría de juegos cooperativos a problemas de decisión que afectan a la política de Defensa del país. El análisis permite evaluar las propuestas sobre procedimientos de votación cualificada ...
  • Cooperation tendencies and evaluation of games 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Puente del Campo, María Albina (SciTePress, 2013)
    Text en actes de congrés
    Accés restringit per política de l'editorial
    Multinomial probabilistic values were first introduced by one of us in reliability and later on by the other, independently, as power indices. Here we study them on cooperative games from several viewpoints, and especially as ...
  • Decisiveness of decisive symmetric games 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Freixas Bosch, Josep; Puente del Campo, María Albina (2011-04-08)
    Report de recerca
    Accés obert
    Binary voting systems, usually represented by simple games, constitute a main DSS topic. A crucial feature of such a system is the easiness with which a proposal can be collectively accepted, which is measured by the ...
  • Dimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness of European voting systems 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Freixas Bosch, Josep; Magaña Nieto, Antonio (2016)
    Article
    Accés obert
    An analysis of three major aspects has been carried out that may apply to any of the successive voting systems used for the European Union Council of Ministers, from the first one established in the Treaty of Rome in 1958 ...
  • Juegos cooperativos y conflictos de intereses. Teoría y práctica. MTM 2006-06064 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco (Universidad de Zaragoza. Instituto Universitario de Matemáticas y Aplicaciones, 2009-03-31)
    Text en actes de congrés
    Accés restringit per política de l'editorial
  • Multinomial probabilistic values 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Puente del Campo, María Albina (2015-11)
    Article
    Accés obert
    Multinomial probabilistic values were introduced by one of us in reliability. Here we define them for all cooperative games and illustrate their behavior in practice by means of an application to the analysis of a political ...
  • Notas sobre los rappels y los descuentos uniformes 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Magaña Nieto, Antonio; Rajadell Carreras, Manuel (2009)
    Article
    Accés obert
    Consideramos los descuentos comerciales por compras basados en rappels. Si se plantea un descuento de tipo uniforme aparece una paradoja no deseada: el “truco del comprador”. Para eludirla se proponen dos variantes que ...
  • Notas sobre los Rappels y los descuentos uniformes 

    Magaña Nieto, Antonio; Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Rajadell Carreras, Manuel (Intangible Capital, 2009-10)
    Article
    Accés obert
    Consideramos los descuentos comerciales por compras basados en rappels. Si se plantea un descuento de tipo uniforme aparece una paradoja no deseada: el “truco del comprador”. Para eludirla se proponen dos variantes que ...
  • On pure bargaining problems 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco (2010-03-24)
    Comunicació de congrés
    Accés restringit per decisió de l'autor
    Pure bargaining problems are considered. By attaching a quasi–additive cooperative game to each one of them, a Shapley rule for this class of problems is derived from the Shapley value for cooperative games. The analysis ...
  • On the generalized decisiveness of decisive symmetric games 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Freixas Bosch, Josep; Puente del Campo, María Albina (2010)
    Comunicació de congrés
    Accés restringit per política de l'editorial
    We study several functions related to the decisiveness of simple games. The analysis, including the asymptotic behavior as the number of players increases, is restricted to decisive symmetric games and their compositions, ...
  • Power and potential maps induced by any semivalue: some algebraic properties and computation by multilinear extensions 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Giménez Pradales, José Miguel (Elsevier, 2011-05-16)
    Article
    Accés restringit per política de l'editorial
    The notions of total power and potential, both defined for any semivalue, give rise to two endomorphisms of the vector space of cooperative games on any given player set where the semivalue is defined. Several properties ...
  • Power, cooperation indices and coalition structures 

    Amer Ramon, Rafael; Carreras Escobar, Francisco (Springer, 2013)
    Capítol de llibre
    Accés restringit per política de l'editorial
    The developments over a thirty-year time span in the study of power, especially voting power, are traced in this book, which provides an up-to-date overview of applications of n-person game theory to the study of power in ...
  • Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Owen Salazar, Guillermo (2011)
    Article
    Accés restringit per política de l'editorial
    Pure bargaining problems with transferable utility are considered. By associating a quasi-additive cooperative game with each one of them, a Shapley rule for this class of problems is derived from the Shapley value for ...