• Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Owen Salazar, Guillermo (2009-03)
    Report de recerca
    Accés restringit per decisió de l'autor
    Pure bargaining problem are considered. By attaching a quasi-additive cooperative game to chatch one of them, a Shapley rule for this case of problems is derived from the classical Shapley value for games. The analysis of ...
  • Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Owen Salazar, Guillermo (2011)
    Article
    Accés restringit per política de l'editorial
    Pure bargaining problems with transferable utility are considered. By associating a quasi-additive cooperative game with each one of them, a Shapley rule for this class of problems is derived from the Shapley value for ...
  • Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Owen Salazar, Guillermo (Springer, 2013)
    Capítol de llibre
    Accés restringit per política de l'editorial
    The developments over a thirty-year time span in the study of power, especially voting power, are traced in this book, which provides an up-to-date overview of applications of n-person game theory to the study of power in ...
  • Pure bargaining problems with a coalition structure 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Owen Salazar, Guillermo (2016-08)
    Article
    Accés restringit per política de l'editorial
    We consider here pure bargaining problems endowed with a coalition structure such that each union is given its own utility. In this context we use the Shapley rule in order to assess the main options available to the agents: ...